PKR to SAR Rate History

The headline shape of PKR-SAR over the past decade and a half is simple: a one-way slide. But the slide wasn't smooth. It happened in distinct, identifiable legs, each tied to a specific economic event in Pakistan. Because the Saudi Riyal is pegged at SAR 3.75 per USD, the SAR side of the pair almost didn't move at all. Almost every basis point in the chart above is a story about the Pakistani Rupee, not the Saudi Riyal.

2010–2013: The gentle slope (~22 → ~27 PKR/SAR). Pakistan exited an IMF stand-by arrangement at the start of this period with reserves around USD 16 billion. The rupee depreciated at roughly 4–6% annually against the dollar — the typical pace expected from a managed-float currency whose inflation runs hotter than its trading partners'. SAR tracked USD as always, so PKR-SAR climbed in parallel.

2014–2017: The artificial pause (~27 → ~29 PKR/SAR). The PML-N government elected in 2013 prioritised exchange-rate stability as a political signal. SBP defended the rupee around PKR 100–104/USD using reserves and external borrowing. PKR-SAR moved only marginally. The pause was sustained but expensive — reserves accumulated through CPEC inflows and external borrowing were spent defending the rate rather than absorbing shocks.

2018–2019: The reset (~29 → ~42 PKR/SAR). The new PTI government, on IMF advice, allowed the rupee to find a market-clearing level. PKR fell from ~110 to ~155 against USD in 18 months — roughly a 40% devaluation. PKR-SAR moved from the high 20s to the low 40s in the same window. This was the single largest one-shot adjustment in the period covered by our chart.

2020–2021: The COVID anomaly (~42 → ~44 PKR/SAR). Pakistan's response to the pandemic — lower oil prices, suspended IMF conditionalities, deferred external debt service via the G20 initiative, a surge in remittances — temporarily stabilised the rupee. PKR-SAR barely moved through 2020 and the first half of 2021.

2022–2023: The crisis (~44 → ~76 PKR/SAR). Russia's invasion of Ukraine sent global commodity prices vertical. Pakistan, an importer of fuel, food, and edible oils, ran out of dollars. By mid-2023 reserves had fallen below USD 3 billion — less than one month of imports. The rupee collapsed against USD, and PKR-SAR followed. At one point in early 2023 the open-market PKR-SAR rate diverged by more than 8% from the interbank rate as exchange companies ran out of inventory.

2024–2025: The stabilisation (~76 → ~75–77 PKR/SAR). A new IMF stand-by arrangement, sharp interest-rate hikes by SBP, and stricter controls on the open market and hawala produced an unusually stable PKR-SAR through 2024 and into 2025. Most months saw moves of under 1%, in either direction. Whether this stability holds depends almost entirely on Pakistan's external position and the next IMF review cycle.

Looking at the chart, three structural drivers explain almost all of the long-term depreciation in the rupee against the riyal.

The inflation differential. Pakistan's CPI inflation has averaged 8–12% annually over the past decade, with spikes above 30% during the 2022–2023 crisis. Saudi inflation has averaged 1–4% over the same period, with periods of outright deflation. Over a long horizon, the currency of the higher-inflation country must depreciate against the currency of the lower-inflation country to maintain purchasing power parity. The cumulative gap between PKR inflation and SAR inflation roughly explains the cumulative depreciation of PKR against SAR.

The current account. Pakistan runs a structural current account deficit — it imports more goods and services than it exports. The gap is filled by remittances (largely from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, the same corridor this site tracks), foreign direct investment, and external borrowing. Whenever remittance inflows slow or borrowing becomes harder, the rupee weakens. The reverse — surplus remittance years, strong export growth, or IMF disbursements — temporarily stabilises or strengthens the rupee.

Oil prices. Pakistan imports almost all of its crude oil and a large share of its refined products. When oil prices rise, Pakistan's import bill rises and the rupee weakens. When oil prices fall, the opposite. Saudi Arabia, conversely, is a major oil exporter — its dollar reserves swell when oil is expensive, which strengthens its ability to defend the SAR-USD peg. So oil price swings push PKR and SAR in opposite directions, amplifying moves in the PKR-SAR pair.

We don't make rate forecasts on this site. But a few honest observations about what the historical pattern can and cannot tell you about future PKR-SAR moves.

What the history reliably shows: PKR has depreciated against SAR every single year over the past 15, with only minor intra-year retracements. The cumulative depreciation has run roughly in line with the inflation differential between the two economies. The largest moves happen during balance-of-payments crises, not during normal years.

What the history does not reliably tell you: the timing of the next big move. Crisis-driven devaluations are clustered, sudden, and politically triggered — you cannot extrapolate them from a smooth historical line. Stabilisation periods can last two or three years before the next adjustment. Anyone selling you a precise PKR-SAR forecast on a one-year horizon is guessing.

The practical use of the chart above is to set context for individual transfer decisions. If you are sending money home regularly, the long-term trend tells you that delaying transfers in the hope of a better rate is, on average, a losing strategy — the rupee tends to be weaker tomorrow than today over multi-year horizons. If you are receiving SAR and converting to PKR-denominated assets (property, savings, education), the same trend works in your favour. If you are a Pakistani business holding SAR receivables or PKR payables, the chart is an argument for hedging or for matching exposures across the two currencies wherever possible.